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Lessons Unlearned: The Legal and Policy
Legacy of the BP Deepwater Horizon Spill
∗

Mark Davis
Abstract

The explosion and blowout of the BP Deepwater Horizon well in
the Gulf of Mexico dominated much of the news and public discussion
during the late spring and summer of 2010. The size and scale of the
blowout and its effects on people, communities, and the environment
produced loud calls for deep changes in the nation’s energy and
environmental laws and policies. While some things have changed, the wide
ranging changes that many expected have not yet come to pass; indeed if
anything the momentum has shifted to letting aggressive oil and gas
development resume and to leave the fundamental regulatory framework in
place. This article argues that this result is anything but surprising and that
the prevailing legal and policy architecture is designed to withstand
changing circumstances, even catastrophic ones like the Deepwater
Horizon blowout. Changing, much less improving, safety and
environmental stewardship practices, will take concerted and focused
action that may only take root after future disasters.
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I. Introduction

In the early hours of April 20, 2010, the 126 workers on the
Deepwater Horizon drilling rig had completed the job of drilling BP’s
Macondo well in the Gulf of Mexico and by 8 PM were in the process of
sealing the well so it could be disconnected from the drilling rig and
“temporarily abandoned” until BP was ready to bring it into production.1
The well had not been an easy one to drill but the potential payoff had been
enough to justify the challenge of looking for oil in incredibly difficult
circumstances,2 circumstances that had put the project millions of dollars
over budget and months behind schedule.3
The process of plugging a well involves sealing the well with a
concrete plug and injecting seawater into the well shaft to displace the
drilling muds that had neutralized the upward pressure of the oil and gas.4 It
is no simple task, but the crew on the Deepwater Horizon was as skilled as
any in the world, being made up of personnel from BP, Schlumberger,
Halliburton, Anadarko, and Transocean.5 All seemed to be going well until
a loud hissing sound was heard around 9:40 PM the evening of April 20th
and drilling mud began shooting from the well.6 For some reason, the
efforts to seal and plug the well had failed, and highly pressurized gas was
rocketing up toward the rig.7 The well had blown out.8 Moments later the

1. See NAT’L COMM’N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL AND OFFSHORE
DRILLING, DEEP WATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING,
REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 1–2 (2011) [hereinafter NAT’L COMM’N REPORT] (providing a
detailed account and specifics of the deep water disaster).
2. The well was drilled in water 4,992 feet deep to a total depth of 18,360 feet. The
waters at those depths are nearly freezing, while the hydrocarbons and salts in the deep
reservoirs, called “pay zones,” are under extremely high pressures and temperatures that
make them extremely challenging to work with, increasing the risk of a blowout. For a more
detailed explanation of the challenges they faced, see id. at 3, 43, 93.
3. See id. at 2 (providing background information of BP and their plans for the
Deepwater Horizon rig).
4. See THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT,
U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, REPORT REGARDING THE CAUSES OF THE APRIL 20, 2010
MACONDO WELL BLOWOUT 21–22 (2011) [hereinafter BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT.],
available at http://www.boemre.gov/pdfs/maps/DWHFINAL.pdf (giving a step–by-step
description of what is required to plug a well and how to do it).
5. See generally NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 1–19 (providing a detailed
description of the Deepwater Horizon accident, the individuals involved, and conversations
that transpired among them).
6. See id. at 8, 113 (describing the preliminary events that eventually became the
Deepwater Horizon disaster).
7. See id. at 114 (providing details as to the pressure and flow of the gas coming out
of the rotary and leading to the inevitable explosions).
8. See id. (giving an explanation of the well and the moments building up to the
blowout).
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mud and gas hit the rig floor where it ignited and produced a series of
explosions that doomed the rig and claimed the lives of eleven workers.9
The tragedy of the blowout was compounded by fact that the
Blowout Preventer Unit (BOP) failed, which allowed the well to flow until
July 15, a total of 87 days.10 Nearly five million barrels of oil were
discharged into the Gulf.11 During that time, it became clear that no realistic
or effective containment plan existed,12 a fact that allowed oil to spread
across the northern Gulf and the shores of five Gulf States.13 The
complexity of assessing the actual rate of flow (estimates ranged from an
early figure of 5,000 barrels per day to 100,000 barrels per day),14 and the
fact that the spill was affecting the entire 5,000-foot deep water column
instead of just the surface,15 compounded the efforts to respond to the spill.
It became clear that the time to prepare for a spill of this type was before it
occurred with the emphasis on not letting it happen.
For such a catastrophe to happen a number of things had to go
wrong. The BOP and the concrete plug had to fail,16 the pre-plugging
pressure tests had to be misinterpreted,17 and early signs that a blowout was
brewing had to be missed.18 Also, the spill response plans drawn by the
industry and approved by the Minerals Management Service were

9. See id. at 12 (explaining the moments when the workers noticed mud, scrambled
to detach their ship, and watched the rig explode).
10. See id. at 274 (explaining the problems with the Deepwater Horizon blowout
preventer and how requiring offshore operators to approve of proposed well designs would
be a step in the right direction).
11. One barrel of oil equals 42 gallons (U.S.), making the Deepwater Horizon spill
roughly 210 million gallons of oil. See BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MGMT., supra note 3, at 1
(estimating how much oil was dispensed into the ocean by the Deepwater Horizon disaster).
12. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 56, 243 (discussing how the oil and
gas industry made massive investments in oil and gas, but lacked to do the same investments
for drilling safety and oil-spill containment technology).
13. See id. at 276–77 (describing the immense impact the Deepwater Horizon spill had
and the challenges the trustees face in assessing and providing compensatory restoration).
14. See id. at 146 (explaining how the inaccurate estimates of the well’s flow
impinged the efforts to adequately respond to the spill).
15. See id. at 277 (assessing a challenge the trustees face in providing compensatory
restoration since most applications of the Natural Resource Damage Assessment process
usually focus on coastal restoration and this spill may have damaged organisms 5,000 feet
below the surface).
16. See id. at 274 (detailing how the Deepwater Horizon BOP was accurate to plus or
minus 400 pounds per square inch which resulted in the crew not getting accurate pressure
readings).
17. See id. at 105–09 (explaining the process of performing a Negative-Pressure Test
and how a false reading from BP’s Well Site leaders played a key role in the spill).
18. See id. at 118–21 (listing the various signs that a blowout was brewing such as
pumping foam cement at a time when it would be unstable, wrongly interpreting a NegativePressure Test, and BP’s temporary abandonment procedure).
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completely out of scale to the actual threats posed by a blowout.19 How
those things came to pass, and the degree to which they contributed to the
disaster, is still being sorted out and will likely be never be fully ascribed,20
but for our purposes that really is beside the point. The central lessons
taught by the Deepwater Horizon tragedy are as follows:
1. It was policy to run the risks that led to the blowout;21 and
2. The fact that bad things happened, even really bad things, has
not by itself changed lesson number one.
II. Minimizing and Externalizing Risk—A Matter of Culture and Policy
The roots of the Deepwater Horizon blowout and spill run deep and
grew from seeds planted well before the Macondo well was drilled.22 Oil
and gas development has often been shrouded in overlapping veils of
national energy policy, environmental policy, local economic and cultural
priorities, environmental advocacy, and industry lobbying and public
relations.23 Beneath this shroud, the truth is that this nation has no clear
energy policy and no true national environmental policy—but we do have
an energy and environmental policy in the Central and Western Gulf of
Mexico. There, it is policy to encourage oil and gas development, to do it
quickly, and to minimize or assume away the risks.24 There is growing
pressure to make that the policy elsewhere in the United States as well.
In the Gulf, the nation’s need for oil and revenue, local desires for
jobs, and the prospect of enormous returns for business combine with the
19. See id. at 83–84 (discussing how neither NOAA nor MMS considered possible
adverse impacts of one well, how MMS relied on conservative measures included in oil-spill
response plans, and how even though the BP Oil Spill Response Plan was not tailored to the
Gulf, MMS Gulf of Mexico Regional Office approved it).
20. See, e.g., id. These reports both considered the causes of the blowout (but did not
fix liability) and recommended changes to the manner in which oil and gas exploration is
done and regulated. An array of public and private litigation was also spawned, most of
which is still pending at the time this article was prepared.
21. See id. at 218 (discussing how even though BP proclaims the importance of safety,
it has caused a number of workplace incidents which indicates the company does not have
consistent and reliable risk-management processes).
22. See id. at 83, 218 (helping to explain how the Deepwater Horizon blowout was
inevitable because of the oil and gas industry’s lack of investments in drilling safety and oilspill containment technology, environmental protections and safety oversight were
ineffective in the Gulf, and BP’s lack of reliable risk-management processes).
23. See id. at 225 (using the American Petroleum Institute (API) as an example of an
organization which has played a dominant role developing safety standards for the oil and
gas industry, yet which lobbies for the industry and favors rulemaking that promotes
industry autonomy from government oversight).
24. See id. at 125–26 (discussing how the time and money-saving decisions by the
staff at Macondo did not consider the ultimate risks).
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region’s historically weak record of environmental and worker protection to
create a hot house of oil and gas development, as well as public and private
revenue generation.25 To be sure, there were and are discordant voices, but
after more than fifty years of offshore drilling, and an even longer history of
coastal and near coast drilling, the two central assumptions of oil and gas
development in the Central and Western Gulf of Mexico are (1) America
needs this oil and (2) we can explore for and extract oil and gas without
adverse environmental effect.26
To understand the events that led to the Deepwater Horizon spill
and its broader importance to how our nation may balance its energy and
environmental priorities, both of these tenets need to be better understood,
since, for good or ill, the lessons taught in the Gulf should be powerful
shapers.
A. Assumption 1 — America needs this oil and gas.
One of the most unassailably true statements one can utter today is
that America needs oil and gas. It fuels our cars, trains, and airplanes.27 It
heats our homes and offices.28 It is a central component in the manufacture
of many of our fabrics, products, and fertilizers.29 It is strategically essential
to our national security and economic well-being.30 But saying we need oil
and gas is not the same thing as pointing to a specific location and saying
we need this oil and gas and we need to get it right now.
The United States is not “energy independent”31 and, by all
accounts, we lack the hydrocarbon reserves ever to be.32 The oil and gas
25. See id. at x (describing how central oil and gas exploration is to the Gulf’s
economy and, because this industry is woven into the fabric of the Gulf economy, states like
Louisiana have suffered destructive alterations to accommodate oil exploration).
26. See id. at 294 (explaining how offshore oil and gas will continue to be an
important part of the nation’s domestic energy supply and how policies about offshore
drilling should be shaped with environmental concerns in mind).
27. See id. at 295 (providing a general idea of how important oil and gas are to our
communication and transportation).
28. See id. (indicating how petroleum is woven into every aspect of our lives).
29. See A Few Products Made From Petroleum, RANKEN ENERGY CORP.,
http://www.ranken-energy.com/Products%20from%20Petroleum.htm (last visited Nov. 8,
2011) (listing products, fabrics, and other objects that are created using petroleum) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
30. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 295 (discussing how our country is
not only dependent on oil and gas for everyday needs, but for our military operations and the
movement of food which are both critical for our national security and a stable economy).
31. See id. (indicating how growing demands for oil around the world pose a longterm challenge for the United States to ever be energy independent).
32. See id. (discussing how the demand for oil in the United States, and its major part
in American society, is one that renders the United States incapable of being self-sufficient
in oil supply).
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(particularly the oil) we actually use comes from around the world; it is an
international commodity, developed and transported by global enterprises.33
The economic viability of developing a given oil and gas field is primarily a
function of prices set on a world scale.34 Because oil pricing is largely
outside the control of the United States, the only way to encourage
development of domestic reserves is to reduce the cost side of the ledger,
which is exactly what we have done through such measures as royalty relief
and expedited and truncated regulatory oversight.35 There may be excellent
reasons for providing incentives, such as providing jobs, generating
revenues, or to ensure that we have accessible domestic supplies to meet
high priority national needs should foreign supplies be disrupted.36 But
those reasons, with the exception of protecting against supply disruptions,
are not elements of an energy policy; more accurately, they are economic,
social, or fiscal policies masquerading as an energy issue. As a result, we as
a nation operate under an energy mythology instead of a clear-eyed
energy/environmental policy. It is a mythology rooted in a chimeric notion
of energy independence, dubious urgency, and a belief that we understand
and have adequately managed risk. It is that myth in the service of industry
objectives and the desire to generate revenues for the federal government
that lies at the heart of this tragedy. And, like all strong myths, it is not
easily shaken by contrary experience.
B. Assumption 2 — We can explore for and extract oil and gas without
adverse environmental and safety effects.
Oil and gas development was, is, and will likely always be a high
risk proposition.37 But one would hardly know that if one were following
the public statements by industry spokespersons and supportive elected
officials.38 In the public arena, discussion (if it can be called that) of oil and
33. See id. at 294 (explaining how domestic consumption of oil has exceeded domestic
production for over sixty years which makes the United States dependent on imports for
fifty-two percent of its oil consumption).
34. See id. at 296 (providing examples of sudden interruptions in the oil supply which
underscore the nation’s vulnerability and affects oil and gas prices worldwide).
35. See id. at 26 (discussing how federal policies helped protect domestic market for
higher-cost offshore oil).
36. See id. at 295–96 (describing U.S. dependency on foreign oil and its national
security concerns regarding hostile exporting nations and the possibility of financing
terrorist organizations).
37. See id. at x (showing how oil and gas development has been, and will continue to
be, a high risk proposition by listing states and regions that have suffered due to oil
exploration).
38. See, e.g., John B. Breaux, Let’s Drill For Oil, WALL.ST. J., Jan. 18, 2001, at A26
(making a case for expanding oil and gas exploration into the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge, arguing that the experience in Louisiana had shown that it could be done without
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gas drilling has taken on an unfortunate polarized tone that emphasizes
either a preference for no new drilling39 or a preference for drilling
wherever there is oil and gas.40 The former view is steeped in the social and
environmental risks posed by oil and gas.41 It is also patently unrealistic
given our current dependence on petroleum.42
The latter “drill, baby, drill”43 view is driven by the assumption that
those risks are minimal and well-managed.44 If the Deepwater Horizon
disaster demonstrated anything, it is that this position is both wrong and
irresponsible—but it is also the view that has dominated oil and gas policy
in the Central and Western Gulf of Mexico for years.45
The history of oil and gas development in the Gulf and its
associated coastal systems dates back more than a century, with plays such
as the Anse la Butte Field in Iberia Parish, Louisiana, proving that the
coastal regions held promising levels of oil and gas.46 The first true open
water well in the Gulf was drilled by the Pure and Superior oil companies in
1938 more than a mile south of the coastal town of Cameron, Louisiana.47
These swamps, marshes, and vast open water areas posed extremely
difficult engineering and logistical challenges, challenges that were met
environmental impact). Asked to defend the statement, Senator John Breaux replied that any
damage that had been done had occurred before environmental restrictions had been
imposed. See John Biers, Breaux Blasted For Praising La. Oil Project, NEW ORLEANS TIMES
PICAYUNE, Feb. 8, 2001, at 5 (“We made mistakes in the early days. We’ve learned from our
mistakes.”).
39. See Support The No New Drilling Act, SURFRIDER FOUND.,
http://action.surfrider.org/p/dia/action/public/?action_KEY=3114 (last visited Nov. 8, 2011)
(asking people to sign a petition and support the No New Drilling Act in Congress) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate, and the Environment).
40. See Breaux, supra note 37 (promoting the oil drilling in the Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge).
41. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 175–76 (discussing the various
impacts oil can have on organisms and plants).
42. See id. at 295 (justifying how it would be impossible for the United States to not
continue drilling since oil and gas is a part of our everyday lives).
43. This phrase was popularized, though not originated, by Republican Vicepresidential candidate Sarah Palin at a debate with Democratic candidate Joe Biden on
October 2, 2008 at Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.
44. See Breaux, supra note 37 (advocating for oil drilling based on studies evaluating
the environmental effects of oil rigs in Prudhoe Bay).
45. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 84 (discussing how the view that
dominated in the Gulf of Mexico was based on the assumption that there were appropriate
measures implemented to avoid risks since the MMS Gulf of Mexico Regional Office
approved drilling plans without additional analysis).
46. See KENNY A. FRANKS & PAUL F. LAMBERT, EARLY LOUISIANA AND ARKANSAS
OIL: A PHOTOGRAPHIC HISTORY, 1901–1946, at 178 (1982) (providing background
information to reflect the long history between the Gulf and oil development).
47. See id. at 208 (discussing the advancement of offshore drilling technology in the
1930s and how this innovation increased shallow offshore exploration in southern
Louisiana).
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with innovation and brute force.48 In those days, the environment was not
something to be protected, but something to be dominated.49 The resulting
network of crisscrossing canals, oil storage pits, waste pits, and abandoned
wells and pipelines has conservatively led to the loss of more than 249,000
acres of land in coastal Louisiana alone between 1932 and 1990.50 The
diversity of those impacts also bears witness to an underappreciated fact—
the footprint of oil and gas development is much bigger than the well site.51
It includes support, transmission, and storage facilities ranging from roads,
ports, pipelines, and helipads to pipe yards, terminals, waste and storage
facilities. Offshore oil development can be fairly compared to space
exploration: for every rocket that is launched there is a vast complex of
construction, support, and service systems that back it up. The same is true
for offshore rigs; even in the absence of a spill, there is a vast, mostly landor coast-based, system of supporting activities that supply all of the
materials, labor, food, water, and emergency services that the offshore
industry requires.52 Though less dramatic than a spill, the environmental
impacts of this sprawling system can be profound and lasting.53 These
historic and ongoing impacts have been documented in a litany of reports,54
Environmental Impact Statements, and perhaps most improbably in a law
suit filed in in 2006 by the State of Louisiana in an effort to block future
offshore leases by the Minerals Management Service until the impacts on

48. See id. at 183, 188–89 (describing the difficult conditions the swamps and marshes
created in southern Louisiana and its impact on the crew).
49. See id. at 183 (elaborating on how the workers would overcome the environmental
difficulties by designing specialized equipment).
50. U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG’RS, LOUISIANA COASTAL AREA ECOSYSTEM
RESTORATION STUDY: PROGRAMMATIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT 4–139 (2004),
available
at
http://www.lca.gov/Library/ProductList.aspx?ProdType=0&folder=1126
(reporting on cumulative coastal land loss in the Deltaic Plain from 1932–1990).
51. See USGS NAT’L WETLANDS RESEARCH CTR., OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF
RELATED PIPELINES AND NAVIGATION CANALS IN THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL GULF OF
MEXICO: RELATIVE IMPACTS ON WETLAND HABITATS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF MITIGATION
STUDY
2
(2009)
[hereinafter
USGS
Study],
available
at
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/4/4875.pdf (discussing the intense
habitat changes and wetland impacts of OCS pipelines and how these are additional side
effects to oil and gas drilling that go unnoticed).
52. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at viii (pointing out that oil drilling is a
complex system and blaming one person or group of people for a spill paints an incomplete
picture because of the number companies, individuals, and organizations involved).
53. See id. at x (discussing the long-term impact to large, sensitive regions such as the
Chesapeake Bay, the Everglades, and the Great Lakes which was not cause by oil spills, but
by alterations to accommodate oil explorations).
54. See USGS Study, supra note 50 (providing an example of a report that was
conducted on the impacts of pipelines and methods used to accommodate oil explorations in
the Gulf of Mexico).
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Louisiana and its natural resources was better acknowledged and dealt
with.55
Of course, when there is a spill, the impacts can be severe and wide
ranging, as demonstrated by the 1969 Union Oil blowout in Santa Barbara,
California (24,000–71,000 barrels),56 the 1989 Exxon Valdez grounding
(10–11 million barrels),57 or the 1979 IXTOC I blowout in the Bay of
Campeche (3 million barrels).58 These events, while hardly commonplace,
are also not rare. Between 1955 and 2010 there were more than 44 notable
blowouts worldwide, nearly one every 15 months.59
There is a similar story on the safety side. It goes almost without
saying that the business of finding and developing oil and gas resources can
be dangerous work.60 It involves working in extreme conditions with
immensely complex machinery to access some of the most powerful and
dynamic natural resources on earth.61 Sometimes things go wrong, and
when they do people can be badly hurt or killed. In 1980, the Alexander
Kielland, serving as a dormitory for offshore oil workers in the North Sea,
capsized killing 123 people.62 In 1988, the semi-submersible rig the Ocean
Ranger sank off the coast of Newfoundland killing all 84 crew members.63

55. See Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ. A. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046 (E.D. La. Aug. 14,
2006) (evidencing additional documentation of the environmental impacts caused by oil
explorations and offshore drilling).
56. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 28–29 (providing information on
how the Union Oil blowout affected thirty miles of California beaches and lethally soaked
birds).
57. See id. at 194 (describing the long-term effects oil spills can have, such as the
post-traumatic stress disorder experienced by the cleanup workers from the Exxon Valdez
disaster).
58. See RESTREPO & ASSOC., IXTOC I OIL SPILL ECONOMIC IMPACT STUDY, VOLUME I,
VOLUME II: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, AND VOLUME III: INPUT-OUTPUT MODEL FOR ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS, INSTRUCTION MANUAL 2 (1982) [hereinafter RESTREPO STUDY], available at
http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PI/PDFImages/ESPIS/3/3931.pdf (describing how the IXTOC
I oil spill affected the region in various ways, such as tourism).
59. See The Real Deal On Blowouts, MARITIME INJURY LAWYER,
http://www.themaritimelawyer.com/the-real-deal-on-blowouts/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2011)
(providing statistics on the frequency of blowouts to support the theory that they are not as
rare as people may think) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Energy, Climate,
and the Environment).
60. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at vi (discussing how the Deepwater
Horizon oil spill caused the lives of eleven crew members and others were seriously injured
as evidence of how dangerous oil and gas developments can be).
61. See id. at 21–22 (detailing the difficulties and risks, such as hurricanes, waves, and
adapting land-drilling methods offshore, all which were associated with the Creole Platform,
the first well in the Gulf of Mexico).
62. See id. at 68 (providing an example of the impact oil rigs accidents can have on all
those involved).
63. See id. at 68–69 (giving an additional example of the serious risks associated with
oil rigs and the tragic fatalities involved).
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Despite the abundant documentation of environmental and safety
risks and a record that shows that blowouts and spills of more than 1,000
barrels are hardly anomalies,64 it has been industry and governmental policy
and practice in the United States to ignore or downplay those facts.65
Indeed, it is fair to say, it has been policy to urge that it would be contrary
to national interests to act more cautiously. That last point was made clear
when Louisiana challenged the adequacy of the environmental analysis
done by the Minerals Management Service in connection with Lease Sale
200 in the Gulf of Mexico.66 Essentially Louisiana made the obvious case
that there were, in fact, significant impacts (often secondary and
cumulative) from offshore development on Louisiana’s coastal resources
and communities, impacts that had become clearer and more urgent
following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005.67 MMS refused to consider
the state’s request to delay the lease sale to allow a fresh look at the
environmental baseline following the hurricanes of 2005 for a better
environmental review, asserting that the purpose of the 1978 amendments
to the Outer Continental Submerged Lands Act was to expedite oil and gas
development and that “any delay of this sale imposes significant and
unnecessary economic and national defense costs.”68 The American
Petroleum Institute echoed the MMS’s concern about economic calamity
and industrial upheaval should the lease sale be delayed or cancelled.69
Although the court denied Louisiana’s request for a preliminary injunction,
it found a substantial likelihood that the state would prevail on the merits,
so MMS voluntarily deferred Lease Sale 200.70 The nation’s economy and
national security suffered no noticeable ill effects.

64. See generally id. (laying out the history of oil and gas development and the
continuous risks and tragedies associated with them).
65. See id. at 84 (providing a perfect example of a governmental organization ignoring
those facts: knowing the history and risks involved with oil and gas development, the MMS
Gulf of Mexico Regional Office approved BP’s Oil Spill Response Plan without any
analysis or close scrutiny).
66. See generally Blanco v. Burton, No. Civ. A. 06-3813, 2006 WL 2366046 (E.D. La.
Aug. 14, 2006) (describing how the governor of Louisiana, Kathleen Babineaux, filed a
motion for preliminary injunction against Minerals Management Services regarding their
compliance with the Department of the Interior’s requirements in connection with Lease
Sale 200).
67. See id. at 5 (discussing that Louisiana made its argument about significant offshore
development impacts by submitting comments to MMS and by a letter sent from LDNR to
MMS regarding the need for them to reevaluate all coastal activities).
68. Id. at *29 (emphasis added).
69. See id. at *1 (supporting the American Petroleum Institute’s view against the
motion for preliminary injunction by emphasizing them as a party to this case).
70. See id. at *21 (discussing the court’s decision to deny the motion for preliminary
injunction, but realizing that the state of Louisiana made legitimate claims that could
possibly be substantiated).
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This boosterish, hyper-confident approach to offshore development
contributed significantly to the Deepwater Horizon tragedy and is in stark
contrast to the way offshore oil and gas development has trended in other
places in the world.71 The question is Why? Three factors go a long way to
answering that question.
III. Discounting Harm
Few things are as driven by self-confidence as business and
politics, so it should not be a surprise to find that the decisions
underpinning the Deepwater Horizon project were shot through with
boldness and certainty. Indeed, so characteristic has overconfidence become
in economic decision-making that it has, with a great deal of fairness, been
referred to by a recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics as “the engine of
capitalism.”72 The Deepwater Horizon is a case study in just how true that
observation may be.
The MMS Environmental Impact Statements that have been
prepared in connection with Gulf oil and gas development are voluminous
tomes that describe at some length all of the things that are important about
the Gulf and the sorts of things that might occur as a result of offshore
activity that could harm them.73 Oil spills are one of those.74 How, then,
could it be possible that a known risk could have been so poorly planned
for?75 The Environmental Impact Statements also provide an answer to that
question.76
First and foremost, large oil spills are described by MMS as “low
probability events.”77 While this is undoubtedly true, it misses the critical
question of how much damage might be done by a truly large spill.78 MMS
71. See e.g., NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 69 (describing foreign
regulators, including the United Kingdom, Norway, and Canada, that, in the aftermath of
fatal accidents, added a risk-based approach to regulation).
72. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW, ch. 24 (2011).
73. See generally MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, GULF OF MEXICO OCS REGION
NO. 2007-018, GULF OF MEXICO OCS OIL AND GAS LEASE SALES: 2007–2010, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (2007) [hereinafter MMS EIS 2007] (describing
important features of the Gulf, including wetlands, beaches, and recreational resources, and
harms that may occur in these areas due to OCS exploration and development, such as oil
spills, wetlands loss, air emissions, discharges, and water quality degradation).
74. See id. at xi (stating that oil spills are a possible harm that could result due to
offshore activity).
75. See id. at xii (acknowledging that oil spills are a risk involved with OCS
exploration and development and describing the predicted impact of a spill).
76. See id. at xii (describing the likelihood of an oil spill and the damage that could
occur as a result).
77. See id. at 228 (stating that there is a low probability of a large oil spill).
78. See id. at 229–32 (describing the likelihood and frequency of an oil spill and
stating that the mean number of spills is less than one for the proposed action in the WPA
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divides spills into two categories, those of less than 1,000 barrels and those
of 1,000 barrels or more.79 No separate analysis of the harm from mega
spills is done or required, even those that are well within the realm of
experience as evidenced by the Exxon Valdez and Ixtoc I incidents.80
Similarly, no separate analysis was done to consider the risks—and
response limitations—of drilling in ultra-deep water. The Oil Pollution Act
(OPA) does require “worst case” response planning, but it was left to MMS
to determine what constituted such a worst case and what an adequate Oil
Spill Response Plan was.81 In the case of the Macondo well, the worst case
scenarios ranged from 28,033 to 250,000 barrels,82 and the response plan
was the now infamous cut and paste plan that included referenced impacts
to walruses, sea lions, and sea otters, creatures that do not exist in the
Gulf.83
That MMS signed off on this Oil Spill Response Plan (and virtually
identical plans for other deep water drillers) signals a lack of serious
consideration by that agency.84 The fact that it was practice to approve Oil
Spill Response Plans within thirty days of submission suggests that cursory
review was in fact policy.85 Clearly, the working assumption was that
nothing really bad could happen and if it did, industry would be ready.86 No
distinction was made between spills of thousands of barrels and hundreds of
thousands, and certainly not millions of barrels.87
Despite a number of laws ostensibly promising that oil and gas
exploration would be done in a cautious manner that was protective of the
environment (and those industries and communities that depend upon it), no
and CPA and estimating the most likely size of an oil spill greater than or equal to 1,000 bbl
to be 4,600 bbl).
79. See id. at 231–36 (using risk analysis of an oil spill for those less than 1,000
barrels and those more than 1,000 barrels).
80. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 70 (describing the scope of the Exxon
Valdez spill with 11 million gallons of oil spilled off of the shore in Alaska); see also MMS
EIS 2007, supra note 72, at 244 (stating that in the Ixtoc spill, the rig fell into the well).
81. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–20 (1990) (establishing liability
and compensation procedures for oil exploration and development incidents and requiring
response plans).
82. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 84 (discussing that BP’s Oil
Response Plan identified three different worst-case scenarios and predicted the amount of
barrels of oil discharge).
83. See id. (stating that BP’s Response Plan copied information from NOAA websites
and much of the information in the Plan did not apply to the Gulf).
84. See id. (noting that the MMS approval of BP’s Response Plan without additional
analysis signaled “a lack of attention to detail”).
85. See id. (explaining that the MMS Regional Office’s usual approval period for oil
response plans was thirty days).
86. See id. (stating that the Regional Office did not submit response plans to other
federal agencies or allow for a period of notice and comment).
87. See id. (describing that BP and MMS paid little attention to detail in writing and
approving the Response Plan).
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site-specific analysis of the risks or harms from the Macondo well or any
other well was being done.88 In many ways, the industry, regulators, policy
makers, and even much of the environmental community had been lulled
into a sense of security based on the experience of the thousands of wells
that had been drilled in the Gulf in the preceding decades.89 By assuming
that past was prelude and that the risks of a blow out or spill in the extreme
conditions of ultra-deep exploration were manageable through the same
techniques used in less hostile environments, effective steps to prevent and
respond to the Deepwater Horizon blowout were not taken.90 By assuming
that the vast scale of harm that resulted was unthinkable, the seeds of
disaster were sown.
IV. Money
From the beginning, offshore oil and gas has been about money and
power.91 In the years following World War II, the nation’s growing appetite
for energy coupled with the United States’ growth as a world power and
need for revenues to create a de facto joint venture between government
and industry.92 This was particularly true in the days before environmental
laws complicated the governmental role.93 The desire to control offshore
development and to reap its financial benefits was at the heart of the
Truman Administration’s assertion of federal control of the nation’s
tidelands and the mineral wealth beneath them as a matter of “paramount”
national interest.94 The ensuing litigation and legislation drew the line

88. See id. at 84–85 (discussing the “minimalist approach” in Federal oversight of oil
and gas activity in the Gulf).
89. See id. at 90 (explaining various factors that came together to cause the blowout,
most notably, a failure of management).
90. See id. at 115 (describing causes of the blowout, including oversight by BP,
Halliburton, Transocean, and government regulators and a lack of technical expertise to
prevent this type of disaster).
91. See id. at 57 (stating that the discussions prior to the enactment of the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 demonstrated that the debate centered around money
and explaining that this Act is the foundation of federal legislation for offshore oil and gas
development).
92. See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–56 (2010)
(establishing an oil and gas leasing program with federal agency oversight for portions of the
Outer Continental Shelf); see also NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 57–58
(describing the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act that gave the federal government
responsibility for overseeing offshore mineral development).
93. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 58–59 (discussing the rise of
environmental laws that impacted offshore oil and gas development).
94. See id. at 57–58 (stating that Truman’s administration assumed power over the
U.S. continental shelf and declared that the federal government had “paramount rights” to
the area, above the rights of the states).
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between federal and state waters and mineral rights.95 What was really at
stake in this protracted dispute was not whether offshore oil and gas
development would occur but whether the federal or state governments
would we reap the benefits of leasing and royalties.96
Oil and gas development can be highly profitable for those in the
business of finding, extracting, and transporting oil and gas.97 It is also
hugely lucrative to the governments that host it.98 Between the years 2000
and 2010, the federal government collected between $4 billion and $18
billion per year in lease payments, royalties, and bonuses.99 It was the
business of MMS to collect those sums, the same MMS that was supposed
to regulate the oil and gas industry.100

95. See Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–15 (2010) (stating that the
United States retains rights of regulation and control over lands and navigable waters,
including leasing, use, and development of the lands and natural resources); see also Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–56(a) (2010) (providing for federal
management of a leasing program for mineral rights for the Outer Continental Shelf); United
States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960) (holding that the states could not interfere with the
United States’ power to property in the Gulf of Mexico and determining that the United
States has rights against the states to the lands, minerals, and natural resources located within
the disputed property in the Gulf of Mexico); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947)
(holding that the State trespassed on government property and was enjoined from doing so
and finding that the national government has superior rights to three miles of property
underwater off of the shore of California with full rights to the resources located within the
area).
96. See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. at 11–12 (analyzing the dispute between
the federal government and the Gulf States over which party has rights to the natural
resources in the disputed area offshore); see also United States v. California, 332 U.S. at 22–
24 (explaining the disagreement between the federal government and California over rights
to land off of the coast of California); NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 58
(discussing estimates of the value of federal land offshore and stating that revenue from
leases of these lands would flow directly into the federal treasury); id. at 63–64 (describing
the increase in oil prices from the original leasing of lands during the Truman administration
to the creation of the MMS and estimating that these revenues and royalties were the second
largest revenue source for the federal government).
97. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 36–38 (discussing the highly
profitable oil extraction for Shell that brought in wells at Auger, an area located 136 miles
off of the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico, and stating that industry collected more
than 10,000 barrels per day); see also id. at 45–47 (describing BP’s success in the Gulf for
oil extraction and the multiple discoveries of large reserves in the Gulf during the 1990s and
2000s).
98. See id. at 64 (showing the United States’ billions of dollars in revenues from 1955
to 2010 and contrasting the differences in revenues from the beginning of offshore oil
reserves discovery to present).
99. See id. (displaying the differences in the federal government’s revenues from
leases of offshore oil reserves from 2000 to 2010).
100. See id. (explaining that Secretary of Interior James Watt created the MMS and that
the responsibilities from offshore leasing would pass from the U.S. Geological Survey to the
new agency).
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The money generating aspect of MMS was not an accident; it was
central to its creation.101 Spurring oil and gas development and the
associated revenues were its reason for being.102 A creation of the Reagan
Administration and Secretary of Interior James Watt, it was envisioned as a
vehicle for leasing one billion acres of offshore areas within a five-year
period.103 The actual leasing history failed to live up to Secretary Watt’s
billion-acre pledge, but the commitment was largely fulfilled in the Central
and Western Gulf of Mexico.104 That area became a generator of great
profit to many in industry and a generator of vital revenues to federal, state,
and local governments.105 Just how important can be seen in the antipathy
for the post-Deepwater Horizon moratorium on new leases and the ensuing
period of greater regulatory scrutiny (or de facto moratorium as critics have
called it).106
The bottom line was and is that without expanded leasing, there
could be no growth of revenue. The model of shared interest in drilling
soon and fast had been built.107 The post-spill breakup of MMS and the
creation of the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and
Enforcement is an important break from that model, but whether it
ultimately succeeds or is subordinated to revenue and energy generation is
an open issue.108
101. See id. at 64–65 (discussing Secretary Watt’s creation of the MMS to assume
leasing responsibilities previously handled by the U.S. Geological Survey).
102. See id. at 65–66 (describing that soon after the Secretary created the MMS, he
issued a new five-year plan to increase leasing to about one billion acres, an increase
eighteen times the fifty-five million acres in the original five-year plan for the MMS).
103. For a concise description of this history, see id. at 63–67, discussing the creation
of the MMS by Secretary Watt and the new five-year plan issued for the Agency to increase
leasing to almost one billion acres.
104. See id. at 65–67 (explaining that Secretary Watt’s plan to drastically increase
leasing in the Gulf was not met on the scale he imagined due to oil exploration and
development unpopularity, buy-back of leases, court challenges, and many one-year
moratoriums issued by the House Appropriations Committee).
105. See id. (noting that Secretary Watt’s plan changed the method of leasing and
drastically expanded offshore drilling in the Gulf and discussing Gulf States’ efforts to
increase their share of revenues received from leases).
106. See, e.g., Ben Casselman and Dan Gilbert, Drilling is Stalled Even After Ban is
ST.
J.,
Jan.
3,
2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/
Lifted,
WALL
SB10001424052970204204004576050451696859780.html (describing that in response to
the delay by the Obama Administration in issuing deepwater permits following the
Deepwater Horizon incident, some companies are shifting investments out of the Gulf).
107. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 33 (discussing the area-wide offshore
leasing program implemented by the Interior Department in 1982 that increased the areas
industry could access for offshore drilling); see also Casselman and Gilbert, supra note 106
(stating that the delay in issuing deepwater permits is negatively impacting large oil
companies that have billions of dollars in investments in the Gulf that are on hold).
108. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 255 (describing the reaction to the
Macondo well failure that led Secretary Ken Salazar to rename the MMS the Bureau of

170

3 WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE, & ENV’T 155 (2012)
V. Law and Culture

Wishful thinking and a need for revenue may explain a lot about
how the Deepwater Horizon tragedy came to pass,109 but they do not
adequately explain why fundamental change in our nation’s approach to its
energy and environmental duties have been slow to come and may not
come at all.110
The relaxed approach to assessing and managing risk on the
Macondo well job were not anomalies (reserving judgment on the issues of
well design and rig management specific to the Deepwater Horizon rig).111
Even if the Macondo well had been perfectly planned and drilled, the
possibility of a blowout and spill still existed (e.g., from earth quakes,
mudslides, acts of terror, or war).112 The decision to ignore or minimize
those risks was born of a culture of risk taking and shared purpose and a
legal framework that shifted risk and responsibility from the industry and
the federal government and onto millions of others in the Gulf Coast, onto
the environment, and onto future generations assuming a large share of
living with that risk.113
It was also born of a fundamental difference between
legal/economic risk and environmental risk.114 Like any business decision,
the decision to look for oil is driven by a risk-versus-reward analysis.115 If
the perceived risks are higher than the rewards, business looks elsewhere
for opportunities. Of course, if it is not good business to explore for oil
offshore, then there is no money coming to government from lease sales,
royalties, or bonuses. Government cannot do much to increase the rewards
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement and to split the Agency’s
responsibilities into three offices).
109. See generally id. at 54–85 (discussing the beginning of the leasing program and
the large revenues obtained by the federal government and explaining oil companies’
expansion efforts for oil drilling to increase their profits).
110. See id. at 122–27 (characterizing the root causes of the Macondo well blowout as
failures in industry and government and opposition to efforts to increase regulatory oversight
and tighten safety guidelines from the government and industry).
111. See id. at 115 (stating that the blowout was the result of a lack of management,
resources, and expertise from the government coupled with oversight by industry).
112. See id. at 127 (acknowledging that deepwater drilling comes with inherent risks
since drilling occurs well below the ocean floor).
113. See id. at 126–27 (discussing causes of the blowout that include industry’s ability
to decide many critical aspects of drilling without oversight or review by MMS, as well as
the lack of training, resources, and political support given to MMS).
114. See id. at 58–59 (noting that when offshore drilling began, there were very few
environmental regulations and any regulations were separate from the offshore leasing
policies until the National Environmental Policy Act was signed into law).
115. See id. at 24–28 (explaining the development of new drilling technologies
beginning in the 1950s and the costs associated with drilling and summarizing industries’
decisions of whether to invest in oil exploration based on how much oil may be discovered).
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for developing products whose value is set by worldwide markets, but it can
certainly do something about reducing financial risk and costs by relaxing
regulatory and royalty requirements—exactly the course of action followed
by the United States in the central and western Gulf of Mexico.116
When oil and gas development began in near-shore and offshore
waters, there were few applicable laws or regulations.117 It was an era of
“minimum regulation, maximum cooperation.”118 In the 1953 film Thunder
Bay, it is a glorious moment, not a blowout, when the intrepid oil man,
played by Jimmy Stewart, strikes oil and the gushing oil covers the rig and
the surrounding waters.119 Those were the years in which the deep (if
sometimes troubled) relationship between the oil and gas industry,
government, and communities were shaped.120 In some places, such as
California, events like the Santa Barbara spill prompted a rejection of the
industry,121 but not in the Central and Western Gulf of Mexico, particularly
off the coasts of Alabama, Louisiana, and Texas.122
116. See id. (stating that while industries initially tried different approaches to oil
exploration in the Gulf, the federal government took a minimalist approach to regulating
these activities and encouraged exploration).
117. See id. (discussing that, during the 1950s and 1960s, the federal government
facilitated oil exploration by increasing the number of areas leased to industry and the U.S.
Geological Survey, the agency in charge of offshore drilling, issued orders that outlined
procedures for drilling, but these were minimal).
118. See id. at 28 (describing federal oversight of oil exploration during the 1950s and
1960s).
119. THUNDER BAY (Universal Studios 1953). This fictional depiction of early offshore
oil exploration in Louisiana includes prescient scenes about the conflicts between the new
oil economy and the traditional ways and values of the local communities. See id. Claims
that the oil men would “kill our shrimp . . . [then] want to kill our people,” and that they
would “spoil everything they touch” were countered by Stewart’s character lecture to an
angry mob:
You may put me out of business . . . but that isn’t important. The important
thing is there’s oil under this Gulf. We need it. Everybody needs it. You need
it. Without this oil this country of ours would stop and start to die. It doesn’t
make any difference what you do to me . . . you can’t stop progress, nobody
can. There’s gonna be a hundred rigs just like this all over the Gulf. This is
gonna be the richest oil field in the world.
See id. In the movie, he strikes oil, falls in love with the local girl who railed against the
“dirty oil men,” and the shrimp love the rigs. A love affair between a state, a culture, an
industry, and a nation all exist on one reel. See id.
120. See generally NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 25–28 (describing Gulf
offshore oil exploration and federal oversight over these activities).
121. See id. at 28–29 (characterizing the Santa Barbara oil spill as the largest oil
accident until the Macondo well blowout and stating that the spill led President Nixon to
issue a moratorium on oil drilling and production in California waters in 1969).
122. See id. at 56 (distinguishing the reaction to the Santa Barbara oil spill with oil
drilling activity in the Gulf and stating that in the Gulf, federal regulations and standards for
oil exploration activities were relaxed, which promoted an expansion of oil and gas
production and an increase in revenue to the federal government).
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Over the course of the second half of the Twentieth Century, the
national trend toward greater environmental and worker safety awareness
produced a series of laws that intended to strengthen environmental
protections and work safety rights.123 Laws such as the National
Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, the Coastal Zone
Management Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act amendments of 1978, and the Oil Pollution
Act created a new framework for regulating offshore oil and gas
development.124 But, so strong were the political/economic ties in the
Central and Western Gulf that even the advent of new environmental
sensitivities and laws were not allowed to get ahead of the basic business of
finding and pumping oil and gas.125
123. See Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1423(h) (1972)
(acknowledging that some animals are in danger of extinction and establishing a framework
for obtaining a sustainable population of marine mammals); see also Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–64 (1972) (establishing a national policy to
preserve and protect coastal areas of the United States and encouraging states to develop
coastal zone management plans); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1972) (setting
regulations on pollutants deposited into navigable waters); Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33
U.S.C. §§ 2701–62 (1990) (establishing provisions for liability and compensation guidelines
for oil exploration and development incidents); National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70 (1970) (creating the Environmental Protection Agency to conduct
activities including research, monitoring, standard-setting, and enforcement of
environmental regulations and requiring federal agencies to submit an environmental impact
statement for activity that has a significant impact upon the environment); Outer Continental
Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–56(a) (amended 1978) (reflecting growing concern over
the increase in oil exploration and drilling activities and establishing greater environmental
safeguards and increased cooperation between the federal government and the states); NAT’L
COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 79–80 (describing the passage of laws for environmental
protection to areas subject to oil and gas exploration and drilling).
124. See Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361–1423(h) (1972) (creating
limits on activities that negatively affect marine mammals, including oil exploration and
drilling); see also Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–64 (1972)
(providing regulations for preserving coastal areas of the United States connected with
economic development of these areas); Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (1972)
(establishing regulations for any substances deposited into navigable waters); Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–62 (1990) (creating guidelines for handling oil spills and
expanding the federal government’s ability to respond to spills); National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–70 (1970) (establishing federal guidelines for
managing environmental issues, including the creation of the Environmental Protection
Agency); Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331–56(a) (amended 1978)
(creating an oil spill liability fund and providing regulations for management and
exploitation of oil in the Outer Continental Shelf); NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at
79–82 (discussing the enactment of new laws to provide regulations for oil exploration and
drilling).
125. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 80–82 (stating that, as a result of
compromises between industry and the federal government, many federal laws designed to
increase regulations on oil drilling and exploration did not apply regulations as stringently in
the Gulf).
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For example, the provision of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act requiring that consideration be given to environmental concerns in
leasing decisions126 is effectively mooted by another provision of that same
Act that requires exploration plans to be approved within thirty days after
they are submitted,127 a window so truncated that it can effectively prevent
any meaningful environmental analysis.128 Other examples can be found in
the practices of “tiering” NEPA compliance and of granting “categorical
exclusions” from NEPA to activities that do not, alone or in combination,
have a significant effect on the human environment.129 In concept both
practices make perfect sense. In practice, however, tiering and categorical
exclusions have too frequently allowed important environmental concerns
to be largely overlooked.130
There is more than regulatory relief behind the inducements to drill;
there are direct financial incentives as well, such as those provided by the
Deep Water Royalty Relief Act of 1995,131 which suspended a portion of
the royalties owed from new deepwater production.
The point here is not to criticize individual laws or policies, but
rather to place them on the table so their roles and impacts can be assessed.
Whatever their merits, there has been general expression of dissatisfaction
with their application in this case.132 That is understandable, as is the

126. See Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(1) (amended 1978)
(explaining that management of the outer continental shelf must be done in accordance with
environmental values).
127. See id. § 1340(c)(1) (establishing that the Secretary of the Interior must approve
oil exploration plans within thirty days of submission).
128. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 80–82 (discussing that portions of
the 1978 version of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act are against full consideration of
environmental concerns since the thirty-day time period is insufficient to determine whether
environmental safeguards can be met).
129. In concept, tiering would allow for general environmental impacts to be reviewed
at earlier phases of the offshore leasing with narrower and deeper analysis to be done as the
activity moved from the leasing to the actual exploration and production phase.
130. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 260.
131. See Outer Continental Shelf Deep Water Royalty Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 104-58,
109 Stat. 563 (1995) (establishing a royalty-relief program to allow industries with leases to
forego the payment of royalties on deepwater oil production).
132. See generally NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 217–91 (discussing that a
combination of increased government oversight and industry changes to increase risk
management and safety regulations are needed to prevent future disastrous oil spills); GULF
COAST ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION TASK FORCE, GULF OF MEXICO REGIONAL ECOSYSTEM
RESTORATION STRATEGY (Preliminary) (2011) [hereinafter GULF COAST RESTORATION
STRATEGY] (describing the need for improvements in government oversight and
collaboration with Gulf States to improve community planning, risk assessment,
environmental stewardship, and science-based methods for monitoring Gulf Coast oil
operations).
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tendency to look for lessons that have been learned from this tragedy.133
But, there is an important difference between a lesson taught and a lesson
learned. Indeed, for a lesson to be learned, there must be some responsible
actor capable of learning. In the case of the Deepwater Horizon spill, where
virtually all of the major actors are institutions of one sort or the other,134 it
is inconsistent with past experience to expect learning and change to flow
naturally from experience. With the exception of the administrative
dismantling of MMS and the decision by industry to create an independent
spill response entity,135 very little has changed despite a plethora of reports,
hearings, and commentaries.136 That should not be a surprise. The legal
framework that directed the actions of the industry and governmental
players is still the same after the accident as it was before.137 The
institutions themselves are very limited in their ability to learn from any
event and to change as a result of it, especially when that would require a
change in underlying law or policy.
Until the systemic conditions, overconfidence, and hubris that
paved the way to disaster on April 20, 2010, are addressed and changed the
only real barrier between ourselves and repeated avoidable tragedy will be
good luck. That does not have to be our path, but to change it will take real
effort.
The further we get from the spill, the less likely it is that anything
fundamental will happen. To be sure, there are still efforts underway,138 but

133. For example, Part III of the National Commission Report is titled “Lessons
Learned: Industry, Government, Energy Policy.” See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1,
at 215–306 (explaining that a need for change in many areas of oil exploration and drilling,
as well as for government oversight, including environmental practices, containment and
clean-up technologies, preparedness, and management behavior, were lessons learned from
the Deepwater Horizon spill).
134. See generally id. (describing the numerous actors at play in the Deepwater
Horizon spill in the areas of oil exploration, oversight, and management).
135. See id. at 55–85 (explaining the timeline of the creation of MMS to the
dismantling of MMS due to the Agency’s mishandling of regulatory duties related to oil spill
response plans).
136. See id. at 249–91 (discussing the numerous hearings held by Congress on the
Deepwater Horizon spill, reports submitted to Congress from industry and federal agencies,
and the recommendations for how to improve conditions and oversight to prevent future oil
spills of the magnitude of Deepwater Horizon).
137. See Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701–62 (1990) (establishing a
process for establishing liability and assessing the damages caused by spills); see also NAT’L
COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 183–84 (discussing the Oil Pollution Act’s provisions for
assessing damages and establishing liability for oil spills).
138. See NAT’L COMM’N REPORT, supra note 1, at 249–91 (proposing recommendations
for improvement in government oversight and industry response and management of oil
spills); see generally GULF COAST RESTORATION STRATEGY, supra note 131 (establishing the
need for increased environmental regulations along the Gulf Coast and presenting a strategy
for Gulf Coast restoration following the Deepwater Horizon disaster, including efforts to
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if they succeed, it will likely be because of an enormous effort on the part
of committed stakeholders and key elected officials to keep the issues alive.
The takeaway here is that people learn, but institutions react. Without
concerted effort, one can only expect them to react in ways that recreate the
pre-event status quo. The Deepwater Horizon blowout may have taught
many important lessons, but as yet, most of them are still unlearned by
those most responsible.

restore and conserve Gulf Coast habitats, restore water quality, replenish and protection Gulf
Coast coastal and marine organisms, and enhance community resilience).

